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Abstract

After twenty years of global negotiations, the world is still far from a
comprehensive climate agreement. The ‘top-down’ approach embodied by the
Kyoto Protocol has all but stalled, chiefly due to disagreements over levels of
ambition and objections to financial transfers. To avoid those problems, many
have shifted their focus on bottom-up ‘linkage’ of regional, national, and subnational cap-and-trade systems. Decentralized architecture has its appeals, but
we argue that linkage among carbon markets ultimately faces the same obstacles
that are at the heart of global climate negotiations.
Linkage can potentially reduce overall costs of tackling climate change by
leveraging the differences in the marginal costs of emissions reductions across
nations. However, as incomes, ideologies and other conditions diverge—and,
thus, potential economic gains from linkage increase—political obstacles to
linkage grow. We identify four obstacles to successful linkage: potential for
gaming of targets; objections to financial transfers; the difficulty of close
regulatory coordination; and incompatibility with other domestic policy
objectives.
Linkage, thus, may be an important political instrument and learning process
but it provides no end run around international “global warming gridlock”
(Victor 2011). A functioning global climate policy architecture still requires close
international coordination with a balance of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’
elements. Only with this realization—and by employing a gradual process toward
full linkage—can early carbon market linkages help facilitate a path towards a
successful global climate architecture.
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“There is…no doubt in my mind that we will progressively realize that the most cost effective way to implement that
global regulation is through linking these individual [emissions trading] schemes, via common standards and rules
that provide enhanced liquidity and fungibility while avoiding double counting.”
—Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

1. Introduction
Although the rate of climate change seems to be accelerating and the human role
and eventual impacts are becoming ever clearer (IPCC 2013), the international political
processes for addressing it appear to have slowed down. The ‘top-down’ approach to
climate change—where states jointly agree to a schedule of emissions reductions
through an international treaty—has fallen out of favor. The Kyoto Protocol is flagging.
Its recent extension through 2020 was largely pro forma. The number of parties is
shrinking, and major emitters, including Canada, Japan and Russia, have indicated that
they will not sign on for another round of commitments. In theory, states should
collectively commit to reducing emissions in order to avoid free riders (Olson 1965).
However, despite the Durban Platform decision to negotiate a new agreement by 2015
“applicable to all”, the climate negotiations demonstrate that such a goal is difficult to
realize in practice.
The purpose of an international agreement is to provide incentives for collective
action by curbing free-riding. It may therefore appear paradoxical, that nations are so
averse to a climate treaty but have begun to adopt policies to address climate change
unilaterally. These include cap-and-trade systems, carbon taxes, commitments to
reducing energy intensity, forest codes to combat deforestation, and a host of policies
aimed at improving energy efficiency, and developing and deploying renewable energy
sources. Cap-and-trade systems, in particular, are becoming increasingly prevalent. The
European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is the largest such market, but
other markets include Australia, New Zealand, California, Canadian provinces, and the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeast of the United States. Soon
South Korea will launch a national trading system, and others—most significantly, some
Chinese cities and provinces—are poised to follow (GLOBE International, 2014; IETA
2012; Grubb 2013). All told, 10% of the world’s population and 35% of the world’s GDP
is regulated by some form of domestic or regional cap-and-trade system today. 2
This emergence of a patchwork of national and sub-national carbon markets has
prompted calls for a “bottom-up” climate architecture (Rayner 2010; Falkner, Stephan
& Vogler, 2010; Victor 2011). Since countries cannot be compelled to reduce through an
international treaty, some observers argue that a more feasible approach, at least in the
short-term, is to let countries or sub-national governments set the pace. This has also
been the recent de facto negotiating position of the U.S. delegation to UN climate talks.
This calculation includes the EU, Australia, New Zealand, California as well as ten northern U.S. states
covered under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and is based on 2010 World Bank
population and GDP statistics. The World Bank (2013) estimates that 7% of global emissions are governed
by a carbon price.
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Linkage plays a prominent role in such a bottom-up architecture. Cap-and-trade
systems lend themselves particularly well to linkage (Burtraw et al., 2013; Jaffe, Ranson
& Stavins, 2010; Jaffe & Stavins, 2008; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2012; Ranson & Stavins,
2012; Stewart et al., 2013). Proponents argue that linking individual cap-and-trade
systems would allow a global carbon market to emerge organically: no top-down cap
would be necessary. Chinese carbon allowances could be bought and sold on European
markets, or vice versa. Linkage would produce both economic benefits—more
reductions at a cheaper cost—as well as political ones—providing an end run around
“global warming gridlock” that has all but stalled the intergovernmental process (Victor
2011). Indeed, some linkage arrangements are beginning to emerge or are already in
place, such as between California and Quebec as well as between the EU and Norway,
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. There are also links created by the flexible
mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation
(JI), and Reducing Emissions form Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD).
Additional links both among existing developed-country and even between developed
and developing countries are being explored, in particular with China.
The logic of linkage is based on the simple premise that the marginal cost of
emissions abatement is lower in some jurisdictions than in others. Since climate change
is a global problem, the location of emissions reductions is irrelevant. Linking markets
leverages this cost differential to provide cheaper ways for reducing emissions. Cost
differentials are greatest between developed and developing countries; in these linkage
arrangements, developed countries, in effect, pay for reductions in the developing world.
In theory then, linking carbon markets should go a long way toward tackling climate
change. Such an approach would increase the total amount of reductions, lower their
total cost and increase financial flows from developed to developing countries that are
often associated with such levels of reductions.
However, we argue that as the potential benefits of linkage grow—by leveraging
differences in marginal abatement costs across linked jurisdictions—so do the political
obstacles. The advantages to linking rest on the age-old principles behind the benefits of
trade: comparative advantage. There is however one fundamental difference, the
“goods” to be traded are the absence of emissions, as measured by emissions credits.
The number of credits each country “needs” is a subjective and political question.
Moreover, the linkage between countries must be established through political
agreement, through which parties agree to the baselines against which abatement is to
be counted. In the end, these political challenges may undermine the economic and
environmental advantages of linkage. Specifically, we identify four political obstacles
faced by bottom-up approach to climate policy: potential for gaming of overall targets;
objections to large-scale transfers to developing countries; the need for high levels of
regulatory coordination; and potential incompatibility with related domestic policy
objectives.
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In the final analysis, these obstacles will reproduce many of the same problems
that have stymied intergovernmental negotiations. 3 The result may be a lower level of
emissions reduction, as countries may have to compromise on environmental efficiency
in order to achieve political feasibility. Helm (2003) suggests the effect on trading on
emissions levels is ambiguous, since less environmentally-concerned countries would
elect to have less ambitious targets, given the option to trade their allowances. 4 We
demonstrate that the four obstacles might lead toward a compromise on emissions
reductions, in favor of political expediency.
Our argument proceeds as follows. First, we briefly explain how linkage works.
Second, we present the standard economic argument for linkage, emphasizing the key
element: differential marginal costs of abatement. We show that a world of linked
carbon markets can, in theory, produce the same level of abatement at lower costs than
a world of separate domestic markets. (Conversely, linked carbon markets could achieve
more abatement at equal cost.) Third, we lay out four political obstacles that work
against the economic logic for linkage. Finally, we argue for a gradual approach to
linkage, emphasizing the need for building strong institutions and framework for
subsequent strengthening of carbon markets.
2. The mechanics of linkage
In a cap-and-trade system, each domestic market distributes allowances to
regulated entities within the jurisdiction. Total allowances are capped at a certain level,
which is decided by the government. If a given entity emits more than its allowances, it
will need to purchase additional allowances from other entities that have a surplus.
Linked jurisdictions can trade in credits or allowances, or both. 5 Allowances are
the emissions certificates apportioned under a particular cap. Direct linkage of two capand-trade systems would enable allowances from one system to be used in the other.
Credits differ from allowances in that they are usually generated through project-level
activities and are often outside the geographic scope of the cap-and-trade system. They
come from third party suppliers, and are also often voluntary. The Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol is an example of a source of credits. It allows
developed countries to meet their reductions requirements under Kyoto through the
purchase of credits generated by emissions reductions activities undertaken in
developing countries, which are not obligated to reduce their own emissions. Offset
credits can also be generated domestically, though they often fall outside the purview of
the cap-and-trade system. Importantly, there is no theoretical ceiling on offset credits—
they could be generated in virtually endless supply—unless each jurisdiction chooses to
limit the amount of allowable credits.
Weitzman (2013) develops this argument in the context of negotiating quantitative limits versus a
uniform global carbon tax. He concludes that negotiating a globally coordinated cap-and-trade system
requires agreement on caps for each country, whereas negotiating a uniform tax only requires negotiating
one price.
4 See also Flachsland et al. (2009) and McKibbin et al (2008) for earlier caveats to linkage.
5 See Lubowski (2012) for a detailed description of the linkage mechanism, with the application to Chile.
3
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Linkage increases liquidity among linked jurisdictions. Links may be one-way or
two-way, direct or indirect, and they may include both allowances and offset credits, or
just one or the other (Jaffe & Stavins, 2008). In a one-way linked market, jurisdiction A
accepts allowances and credits, if it so chooses, from jurisdiction B, not vice versa. In a
two-way linked market, allowances are freely accepted by both A and B. These two
markets are thus directly linked. If a third jurisdiction, C, chooses to trade with B, then
it is indirectly linked to A. As we discuss in section 4, indirect linkages are important
from a political perspective; a market that is indirectly linked to another becomes
subject to its rules without being involved in their creation.
Linkage presents theoretical and practical challenges. Some are mundane: for
example, most markets use metric tons as the basic nomination; the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeast U.S. uses short tons. Other questions
of interoperability, such as the type and amount of third-party offset credits allowed, can
be more fundamental. We explore those in the following sections.
3. The economic case for linking trading
differential marginal costs of abatement

systems:

Leveraging

Bigger markets are better. That, in a nutshell, is the economic logic for linking
separate carbon markets. Global trade in goods and services maximizes comparative
advantage and increases output. Global trade in emissions allowances would fulfill a
similar promise. Open and linked markets are more liquid and also more efficient,
allowing money to flow where the marginal cost of abatement is lowest. Countries that
can produce reductions more cheaply will do so and sell them to those nations where
emissions reductions are more expensive to generate.
The differential global costs of abatement are key to making linkage work: they
lower total costs and raise overall reductions. In particular, marginal costs of abatement
are typically lower in the developing world (Dellink et al 2010). This assumption hinges
not just on the technical abatement potential but also on emissions reductions baselines
and growth rates. Baselines matter because they are the point of reference for evaluating
reductions. Since levels of abatement are fundamentally unobservable, baselines are
critical for measuring success. But success varies dramatically with different economic
growth rates. Fast-growing developing countries will have to work harder to meet (or
exceed) the baseline than slow-growing developed ones.
CDM exemplifies the logic of leveraging differences in marginal abatement costs.
It has catalyzed the transfer of billions of dollars to the developing world. Reducing the
marginal ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2 e) emissions is more expensive in
Germany, say, than in China. In fact, China’s large source of potential emissions
reductions and domestic institutional capabilities has catapulted the country into the
dominant source of CDM offset credits. China is now developing seven regional capand-trade trial systems, and some observers are already eyeing potential future linkage
opportunities. At least in the short-term, a linkage between China and Europe would
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lower reduction costs in Europe, since the marginal costs of reducing emissions are
significantly lower in China. (As we argue in Section 5, eventual linkage may indeed
serve a vital role as a catalyst for developed countries to commit to emissions caps.)
To formalize the standard economic argument for linkage, consider two
countries, one developed and one developing. Assume the developed country faces a
high marginal abatement cost curve, MC H , whereas the developing country’s curve is
much lower, MC L .
We posit that the developed country faces a high initial emissions reduction
target, X H 0 whereas the developing country faces a lower target of X L 0. Total abatement
across both countries will equal ΣX0 = X H 0 + X L 0 (Figure 1).

Figure 1— Initial allocation of abatement commitments and costs for high and lowabatement cost countries.

Figure 1 shows a world without trading, where the large shaded area under MC H
represents the total cost of emissions for a given level of emissions reduction in the
developed country, and the small shaded area under MC L represents the total
abatement cost in the developing country.
The high-abatement cost country faces significantly higher costs than the lowabatement cost country. In particular,
P H 0 >> P L 0,
and, thus, given X H 0 > X L 0 assumed above,
𝑋 0

𝑋 0

∫0 𝐻 𝑀𝐶𝐻 ≫ ∫0 𝐿 𝑀𝐶𝐿 .
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Linkage across the two countries, then, could potentially decrease overall costs
significantly while keeping the initial abatement target intact (Figure 2).

Figure 2—Efficient allocation of abatement commitments with trading.

Overall abatement across both countries, ΣX*, equals the initial position from
Figure 1, ΣX0. Yet total costs are much lower. Trading allows for the same level of
emissions reduction at lower cost, as represented by the significantly smaller combined
shaded areas in Figure 2. (Alternatively, much more abatement could have been
achieved for the same total cost, if only most of the money were spent in the lower-cost
abatement country.)
Figure 3 takes the precise areas from Figure 1 and Figure 2 and shows their
relationship more directly. The top line comes from Figure 1, showing the initial
abatement commitment and costs. The bottom comes from Figure 2, showing the final
abatement commitments and costs for developed and developing countries,
respectively.
Total abatement remains the same,
X H 0 + X L 0 = X H * + X L *,
but there are potentially large gains from trade:
𝑋 0

𝑋 0

𝑋 ∗

𝑋 ∗

∫0 𝐻 𝑀𝐶𝐻 + ∫0 𝐿 𝑀𝐶𝐿 ≫ ∫0 𝐻 𝑀𝐶𝐻 + ∫0 𝐿 𝑀𝐶𝐿 .

The total abatement costs without trading are much larger than the total costs with
trading, despite equal overall abatement efforts across both regions.
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Figure 3— Abatement and costs by high and low-cost countries (top and bottom,
respectively), before and after trading (left and right), taking the precise areas
from
Figures
1 and 2. across both countries remains the same,
While
overall
abatement

Important for our analysis is that linking across jurisdictions will create winners
and losers within and across cap-and-trade systems. Within a particular cap-and-trade
system, net buyers will stand to gain if the post-linkage market price is lower than prior
to linkage. Similarly, net sellers will stand to gain if the post-linkage market price is
higher. This creates natural constituents for linkage as well as natural opponents within
any cap-and-trade system.
Linkage also generates winners and losers across cap-and-trade systems. In
economic terms, this implies a potential Pareto improvement from trading. While total
abatement costs across both countries are significantly smaller after trading, costs to the
developing country will rise.
To turn this potential Pareto improvement into an actual one requires monetary
transfers from the developed country to the developing one that are greater than the
additional cost to the developing country, yet smaller than the cost savings from the
developed country:
𝑋 ∗

𝑋 0

𝑋 0

𝑋 ∗

∫0 𝐿 𝑀𝐶𝐿 − ∫0 𝐿 𝑀𝐶𝐿 ≤ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟 ≤ ∫0 𝐻 𝑀𝐶𝐻 − ∫0 𝐻 𝑀𝐶𝐻 .

These wealth transfers are potentially large and could lead to significant overall cost
savings, amounting to half of overall abatement costs (Dellink et al. 2010). The financial
flows in linked cap-and-trade systems are the transactions between regulated entities.
Some jurisdictions may elect not to link simply due to domestic political objections to
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transferring wealth abroad; thus, political support for potentially large financial flows is
a necessary condition for linkage.
This point is worth emphasizing: It is generally assumed that the low-income
country has the opportunity to ‘save’ on overall costs by abating more. But the incentives
for doing so depend on financial flows from high-income nations. Financial flows are
also at the heart of the politics. It is not surprising that the developing world advocates
for much bigger transfers than the developed world, a fundamental difference in
negotiating positions that has made a global grand bargain extremely difficult.
We argue in the next section that a bottom-up approach appears to sidestep these
contentious issues but in fact, only hides—or perhaps delays—them. Linking markets
would ultimately face the same inherent obstacles as a ‘top-down’ agreement: all
jurisdictions need to agree to the overall level of ambition and the resulting monetary
transfers. This holds particularly true for linkage between jurisdictions with large
differences in marginal abatement costs—i.e. precisely in those situations when linkage
can yield its biggest economic dividends. By contrast, linkage among developed-country
jurisdictions avoids many of these issues. That is why we have already seen such
developed-developed country linkages, and why they should indeed proceed in many
instances. Linkage among jurisdictions with large differences in marginal abatement
cost structures will be much more difficult to pursue.
We also address a more fundamental question around policy objectives: Full
linkage assumes a desire to drive down carbon prices, in particular in the high-cost
abatement country. What if maintaining initially higher compliance costs is indeed in
the country’s long-term interest? Even then, linkage may still be desirable, largely as a
way to encourage other countries to take up emissions reductions goals. But that, too,
falls outside the strict market logic of minimizing costs. The most economically
attractive linkages—between developed and developing countries—will be particularly
challenging.
4. International and domestic political obstacles to linkage
The economic logic for linkage is sound: as long as there are differential marginal
abatement costs across nations, linked markets can be both economically efficient and
environmentally beneficial. Linking jurisdictions can jointly achieve greater reductions
at less cost.
Insights from both political science and economic practice, however, suggest
reasons to be less optimistic. The assumptions of this model ignore important political
dynamics, which, if not addressed, could ultimately undermine the promised benefits of
linked domestic carbon markets. These problems are especially likely among linking
jurisdictions with wildly different marginal abatement costs, where environmental and
economic gains from linkage could, in theory, be largest. Successful linkage, which we
define as a net reduction in emissions among trading entities, must meet at least four
conditions conditions.
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First, success requires that participating jurisdictions do not game the system by
setting baselines without trying to maximize short-term, domestic economic gain.
Rather, they need to commit to allowance allocations over the medium and long term, in
spite of uncertainty about costs. Second, it requires political support for potentially large
financial flows from the developed to the developing world that result from leveraging
differential marginal costs of abatement. Third, any successful market linkage demands
close regulatory coordination, which becomes increasingly difficult as more
jurisdictions—in particular those with unequal marginal abatement cost curves and
differential regulatory capacity—join a linked market system. Fourth, successful linkage
needs to be compatible with other domestic policy objectives, in particular the lowering
of compliance costs.
In the following discussion, we show why it may be problematic to assume that
all four of these conditions hold.
4.1 Lower levels of ambition
The political appeal of a bottom-up linkage approach is its flexibility. Each
trading jurisdiction can choose its level of ambition, according to the political
constraints and opportunities of the domestic context. Any top-down approach of
‘targets and timetables’ used in Kyoto limits the range of acceptable commitments at the
international level, since each government is constrained by domestic preferences
(Putnam 1988).
A bottom-up approach, proponents argue, bypasses these difficulties, by allowing
each jurisdiction to choose their level of ambition without regard to other governments.
However a bottom-up approach may afford too much flexibility in one of two ways.
First, each jurisdiction could simply choose an unambitious cap. Second, a given
jurisdiction could lower its level of ambition if compliance becomes too costly.
The trial phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) provides a useful
illustration of the first problem, the unambitious cap. From 2005 to 2007, individual
member states set their own emissions reduction targets (Ellerman, Convery & De
Perthuis, 2010). Only then did the individual caps get added to a whole. The result was a
large over-allocation of allowances in Phase I, resulting in a significant drop in prices in
April 2006, once that over-allocation became evident to market participants.
Importantly, while allowance prices for Phase I decreased significantly
(eventually approaching zero, because Phase I allowances could not be used in future
periods), futures prices for Phase II allowances held comparatively stable. In Phase II,
the ETS became closer to a top-down arrangement. Though based on earlier domestic
allocations, Phase II allocations no longer allowed member states to set their own caps.
Instead, the European Commission was endowed with the authority to change member
state’s proposed caps. The allocation mechanism resembled something much closer to a
top-down ‘targets and timetable’ approach.
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A further problem is that too much flexibility after linkage occurs can also result
in lowering levels of ambition. If allowances become sufficiently scarce, then linked
jurisdictions can raise caps or increase the availability of credits from other markets. In
the former, the trading entity essentially prints money by creating more allowances
(Victor and House 2004). 6 In the latter, regulated entities can seek offset credits in
other markets—presumably with lower prices—allowing them to meet reduction
requirements without much change in behavior.
Enhancing supply through either raising caps or opening markets to offset credits
has two effects: First, and most obviously, it reduces the level of ambition of climate
change policy. A higher cap means less abatement. It is noteworthy, for example, that
despite fairly extensive market infrastructure, we are not reducing our global emissions
by nearly as much as is needed: Despite cap-and-trade systems covering 10% of the
world’s population and 35% of the world’s GDP, the world is nowhere near meeting the
2°C target that negotiators aimed for in Copenhagen. Domestic cap-and-trade systems
are setting up important frameworks and institutions for eventual reductions, but
overall caps will need to be much more comprehensive and ambitious in subsequent
trading periods to achieve the desired results. 7
Another implication of lowering levels of ambition is that it undermines the
efficiency gains of linking markets. Raising caps within a given cap-and-trade market
means reducing its marginal cost of abatement; thus, that market has less to gain from
purchasing credits from other linked markets. As marginal costs of abatement equalize
across markets, gains from trade among linked jurisdictions approach zero.
Jurisdictions that choose not to raise their caps will face higher costs. In turn, this may
spark a race to the bottom. In this sense, the ‘bottom-up’ approach quickly creates
interdependencies among linked markets where collective action is needed to avoid
beggar-thy-neighbor policies—precisely the dynamic that has plagued the international
process.
This ‘race to the bottom’ is most likely among trading jurisdictions with widely
different marginal abatement cost curves. Two developed-world jurisdictions with
similar levels of ambition, marginal abatement costs and overall system designs may
find it relatively easy to overcome this obstacle. However, there is little economic gain in
terms of lower overall abatement costs from such a link. Instead, the economic
advantages are due to having a larger overall market and, thus, increasing the fungibility
of allowances. This logic, for example, applies to the link between California and Quebec

This can, of course, go either way; states could also decide to lower caps, making environmental targets
more ambitious. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative recently took such a step, announcing plans to
tighten its caps by 45%. The EU is considering similar steps around “backloading” allowances and, thus,
temporarily tightening its own cap.
7 The EU does, in fact, have a long-term commitment of reducing emissions by 1.74% per year, every year.
By 2050, that will result in emissions that are 70% below 2005 levels. Even that, though, is not yet in line
with most commonly cited obligations for the EU of 80% by 2050, and the commitment only covers
slightly less than half of all of the EU’s carbon dioxide emissions.
6
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where the dynamics described here are largely absent. They become more pronounced
as the wealth gap between countries widens.
4.2 Need for supporting financial flows
The economic logic of linkage rests on differential marginal costs of abatement
and the resulting international monetary transfers (section 3). As soon as it is cheaper to
abate in one country over another, buying permits on the international market—whether
an offset market, or a set of linked regional, national or sub-national markets—is
tantamount to a financial transfer between trading entities.
Yet large scale financial flows of capital from developed to developing countries
are likely to face the same obstacles as those that occur through a top-down agreement.
The negotiations around mobilizing $100 billion per year from developed to developing
countries by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation, from both public and private sources,
provides one example of the difficulties embedded in such a negotiating process. Only a
fraction of the $100 billion has been committed from public sources, and even less of
that has been disbursed. 8 Setting up one of the funding vehicles, the Green Climate
Fund, has been an extremely contentious process (Abbott and Gartner 2011).
CDM, too, exemplifies the complex politics of financial transfers. At its height in
2006 and 2007, annual transfers in the CDM approached $10 billion. Most of the
money came from the European Union and was invested in China (World Bank, 2012).
Very little went to other developing and least developed countries. This pattern raised
concerns about the distribution of wealth transfers. To broaden the distribution of
funds, many have called for CDM reform, especially in Europe (Report of the High Level
Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012). In fact, the EU has since restricted certain
types of offsets, both by sector and region.
There is an alternative interpretation of the CDM critique: CDM has fulfilled its
exact purpose, enabling China to move from a supplier of offset credits to a nation
implementing its own emissions mitigation policies. It is now in the process of creating
seven regional cap-and-trade trial systems. Limited linkage may play just such a role
now in moving China further along to agreeing to firm national emissions reduction
targets. However, such a shift might reproduce the same political problem: the need for
potentially large financial flows from developed countries to, in this case, China.
In essence, full linkage among a broad swath of developed and developing
countries and jurisdictions will effectuate the very same types of financial flows that
have been controversial in CDM and the Copenhagen Accord. Assuming similar levels of
ambition, the size of the eventual transfers will likely be similar in both top-down and
bottom-up situations.

See the UNFCCC Finance Portal for Climate Change for the most updated figures:
http://www3.unfccc.int/pls/apex/f?p=116:8:5075510030800287. See also: Buchner et al. (2012).
8
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4.3 Loss of regulatory autonomy
Linking markets also entails coordination on important design elements. Will
links be one-way or two-way? Will they include offset credits or allowances? Will full
banking and borrowing be permitted? Will there be limits on the number of allowances
or credits permissible from other markets? Since design choices in one jurisdiction will
affect policy in another, these decisions will require some level of consensus among
linking jurisdictions. Such consensus may be easily achieved among two parties, but
quickly becomes more complex when there are multiple jurisdictions involved.
Two key regulatory challenges emerge. First, linkage requires robust regulatory
frameworks. Carbon markets create a unique commodity. The metric ton of CO 2 e is
entirely a policy creation which requires careful and sustained oversight. Measurement,
monitoring reporting, verification, compliance, and enforcement issues are paramount.
Linking jurisdictions need to agree on standards as well as on controls for quality and
quantity of third-party offset credits. Jurisdictions with lax compliance will likely see the
price of their allowances drop.
One proposal to address this issue is to require buyers to be liable for the quality
of the allowances and offsets purchased (Keohane and Raustiala 2008; Victor 2011).
Rather than trying to impose post hoc sanctions on sellers of sham offsets—a difficult
task for low capacity governments and when powerful sellers are involved—one solution
may be to require buyers to assume responsibility if the permits are invalid.
A second challenge that compromises regulatory autonomy is the increased
interdependence among linked jurisdictions. Larger trading systems achieved through
linkage would increase liquidity. However, they will also propagate any possible early
mistakes in system design. At the extreme, the collapse of one system—either because of
design flaws, regulatory uncertainties, or other economic or political circumstances—
could result in serious impacts on linked markets. The recent financial crisis serves as a
powerful example of the vulnerabilities of linked systems with decentralized regulatory
oversight in an entirely different realm.
The need for regulatory coordination and the interdependence created by linkage
both curtail each jurisdiction’s autonomy. This issue becomes even more pronounced in
cases of indirect linkage, where a linked jurisdiction may end up being subject to the
effects of rules that it did not directly agree upon.
Threats of the loss of regulatory autonomy will prompt linking jurisdictions to
negotiate for favorable designs. Some linking jurisdictions will push to lock-in favorable
rules; others may want flexible rules that can be amended to ensure favorable
circumstances in the future. Late-comers may lobby for changes in the rules, or be
dissuaded from joining altogether.
The appeal of bottom-up markets is, in some way, to provide a testing ground for
different design options. Linking markets prematurely would lock in these designs and
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set de facto standards across large, international trading systems. One fear is that early
linkage of markets will lock in design standards that have yet to withstand the test of
time or, worse, create a race to the bottom when it comes to setting overall regulatory
standards.
4.4 Competing domestic objectives
Lastly, there is an important caveat to the assumptions underlying any linkage
argument. The economic logic for linkage assumes the desire to reduce costs of
compliance, holding levels of ambition constant. Yet, linkage will produce winners and
losers within a given jurisdiction. Those with high marginal costs of abatement will be
pleased by lower compliance costs. However, potential permit sellers—that is, those with
low costs of abatement—will lose out, since they may be undercut by allowances
purchased abroad. Thus, although overall costs would be reduced by linkage between a
developed and developing country, within each country, these costs will be unequally
distributed.
Similarly, there will be winners and losers across jurisdictions. Consider
countries that face a higher carbon price after linkage. The country as a whole benefits
from exporting permits. The sellers of permits will benefit. Buyers, however, will face
higher prices.
Then there is a potentially even more fundamental objection. Early movers, like
the EU, who have shown a willingness to overcome global free-rider effects unilaterally
have revealed to be driven by another rationale than that of making permits cheaper. In
the EU, for example, climate policy is often seen to be about creating the preconditions
for a long-term transformation to an economy free of fossil fuels. Cap and trade, thus,
serves as one tool for this purpose, but it is only one. Others include direct support for
renewable energy and energy efficiency that come at higher costs per ton of CO 2 e abated
in the short run but fulfill other goals (Aldy and Pizer, 2014).
As a result, some countries may be skeptical about linkage simply because they
want to maintain a relatively high domestic carbon price in the short run. Jaeger et al.
(2011), for example, shows an inherent time tradeoff: steeper emissions targets now may
result in cheaper abatement costs in the future. Following this line of thought, lower
short-term prices achieved through linkage may not be in the strategic interest of some
member states of the EU. Countries that wish to spur innovation or that have strong
renewable energy sectors may not wish to lower the price of carbon in the short-term.
Conversely, in some cases, linkage may be useful in promoting multiple policy
objectives simultaneously. For example, discussions of incorporating credits from
projects Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) into
carbon markets is not only a way to reduce emissions, but will also slow deforestation
and preserve biological diversity. In cases where multiple policy objectives can be
achieved through linkage, we expect its likelihood to increase.
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Importantly, linkage may serve as an incentive to motivate others to commit to
binding emissions reduction targets on their own. For example, the EU had long held
the position of global leader on climate change, and is using multiple tools to reduce its
emissions and encourage others to do so. Linkage is part of this overall plan. The EU
plainly says that an international carbon market will develop “through ‘bottom-up’
linking of compatible emissions trading systems.” 9 It further states that “linking the EU
ETS with other cap-and-trade systems offers several potential benefits,
including…supporting global cooperation on climate change.”
The EU example shows the mechanism through which linkage could potentially
be very useful: as a political incentive and interim step toward stronger global climate
commitments. The drive toward linkage may serve domestic political objectives, even
without the pure economic argument for linkage. Politically, linking one’s domestic
trading system may serve to demonstrate commitment and a leadership role. Once
linked, it may be more difficult to abandon or weaken one’s cap-and-trade system, even
if weakening may now be in one’s short-term economic interest (4.1). These political
reasons alone may provide sufficient justification for linkage, but we need to recognize
that they are distinct from the traditional economic arguments for linkage outlined
above. In the final analysis, even politically motivated linkage will face the same issues
of potentially lower levels of ambition, the need for financial flows, and the potential
loss of regulatory autonomy.
5. A path forward: An incremental approach to linkage
Linkage has been proposed by academics and policymakers alike as an alternative
to the top-down intergovernmental approach of the Kyoto Protocol (Burtraw et al.,
2013; Jaffe, Ranson & Stavins, 2010; Jaffe & Stavins, 2008; Metcalf & Weisbach, 2012;
Ranson & Stavins, 2012). Our analysis suggests that four potentially significant
obstacles need to be overcome in order for linkage to build sustainable systems that
achieve the twin long-run goals of reducing emissions and the cost of compliance.
Achieving these goals will require navigating complex tradeoffs between
efficiency and political feasibility. In particular, there are several design implications of
this analysis: First, linkages among developed countries are less politically
problematic—in part also because they yield fewer economic gains. Second, bigger
markets are typically better, but linking markets may also introduce political
unpredictability associated with a loss of regulatory autonomy and the need for close
coordination among jurisdictions with potentially competing objectives. Third,
differential time horizons among linked jurisdictions will increase opportunities for
gaming. Finally, banking and borrowing increases price stability and are clearly
desirable features in any cap-and-trade system, but they may also accentuate any of
these tradeoffs.

9

See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm
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Confronting these tradeoffs necessitates an incremental approach to linkage. 10 In
the short term, the goal of bottom-up policy should be to focus on building operational
systems. As such, experimentation and learning are important (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010),
and those experiments may best proceed while focusing on domestic institutions. If
states and sub-national jurisdictions do choose to link, they need to be prepared for the
set of potential obstacles like potentially large financial transfers. This also implies the
need to anticipate the full range of political implications related to the loss of any
regulatory autonomy. After a certain point, bottom-up approaches will need to
overcome political challenges similar to those created by a negotiated, top-down
solution. In the meantime, though, bottom-up solutions may help states develop
domestic carbon markets and catalyze more ambitious global action (Stewart et al.,
2013).
A number of jurisdictions in developed countries have already linked their
markets. The EU has two-way linkages with Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Switzerland. California has linked with Quebec. New Zealand and Australia have linked
their markets (though the status of Australia’s carbon market is in flux). Other linkages
are sure to come, revealing apparent political advantages to linked systems in these
cases. 11 Developed-country linkages often pursue objectives other than overall cost
reduction—as, in fact, they should. Catalyzing others to change is an important overall
policy goal.

6. Conclusions
As states develop their national climate policies, we will see a combination of
bottom-up arrangements and top-down negotiations. As different domestic systems try
to link, they will confront issues related to the level of ambition, oversight and policy
design. Some of these coordinating challenges may be easier than others. The setting of
the overall cap in each jurisdiction, for example, is likely the most visible process, which
will raise different questions from other less visible design decisions such as the
verification of third-party offsets.
This bottom-up process may create a renewed interest in and impetus for more
globalized agreements. International climate architecture could do worse than mimic
the EU’s ‘model.’ Right now, we are in the global equivalent of something akin to the
EU’s Phase I, where each country sets its own level of ambition. The Durban Accord and
mandate to negotiate a global set of ambitions by 2015, to become effective by 2020,
already points the way toward Phase II, where there is some loose coordination of caps.
Most importantly, everyone from climate negotiators to domestic politicians designing

10 See Burtraw et al. (2013) for an alternative approach to gradual linkage, with a direct application to
RGGI and California’s AB 32 cap-and-trade system. Moreover, informal linkages, such as through MOUs,
can help jurisdictions “align” their practices before formal arrangements are codified.
11 Dellink et al. (2010) suggests that linkage among Annex I countries would only lead to “moderate
aggregate cost savings.”
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their own domestic systems, should keep the global equivalent to EU-ETS’s Phase III in
mind—a hierarchical system with a firm, global cap on emissions.
Until then, linkage ought to be taken for what it is: a potentially important but
also limited step toward a more globalized climate policy. Early linkages reveal the
political if not the economic advantages of such arrangements. That said, bottom-up
systems will not be able to avoid the very real issues that have haunted top-down
negotiations for so long. The larger the economic advantages to linkage, the greater will
be the visibility of issues such as overall levels of ambition, supporting financial flows,
regulatory autonomy, and competing domestic objectives.
We are in the experimental phase of a potentially far-reaching undertaking:
creating a global market for carbon. Given the complexity of this project, we advise
proceeding with caution: the simpler the linkage arrangements, the better. That
potentially implies quantitative and time limits for early linkages. These limits will
provide sufficient transparency and certainty to begin the trading process, while
minimizing the risks of unanticipated adverse consequences. Markets engaged in
linkage should first focus on creating sound infrastructure for global carbon markets, a
process that begins at home.
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